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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
restrictions on the landowner's use of his property Therefore,
this extension should not be followed by this state.
EDWIN ODLAND
LIBEL AND SLANDER-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-THE RE-
QUIREMENT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES-In a libel action the trial
Court of Ramsey County ruled that the publication in issue
was libel per se. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
assessing actual damages at $0 and punitive damages at
$5,000. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was granted, and on appeal the Minnesota Supreme
Court held: punitive damages in a libel per se action are
recoverable in the absence of actual damages. Loftsgaarden
v Reiling, 126 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1964)
Generally, punitive damages are awarded where factors
aggravating the plaintiff's injury are present; those usually
considered are fraud, willfullness or wantonness, oppression,
malice, or violence.'
The great weight of authority requires actual or com-
pensatory damages as a prerequisite to the recovery of
punitive or exemplary damages, 2 since the defendant may
not be punished for his wrongful conduct alone.3 Therefore,
there must be a separate cause of action for compensatory
damages, exemplary damages being mere incidents to that
cause of action. 4 More often than not, under this theory,
there must be an actual award of compensatory damages.,
North Dakota, along with the great weight of authority, deems
1. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 29 (rev. ed. 1961).
2. See e.g., Manhatten Credit Co. v. Skirvin, 228 Ark. 913, 311 S.W.2d 168
(1958) Barber v. Iohl, 40 N.J. Super, 526, 123 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1956)
Haydel v. Morton, 8 Cal. App. 2d 730, 48 P.2d 709 (1935).
3. OLECK, op. Cit. supra note 1, § 275D.
4. Tyra v. Board of Police & Fire Pension Comm'rs., 32 Cal. 2d 666, 197
P.2d 710 (1948).
5. Manhatten Credit Co. v. Skirvin, supra note 2 (distinguishing between
actual and nominal damages and holding that the latter will not support an
award of punitive damages).
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it necessary to prove the loss and grant a compensatory
award .6
In some jurisdictions recognizing compensatory damages
as a prerequisite to the recovery of exemplary damages,
the emphasis is placed on the wrong done to the plaintiff
rather than the actual awarding of compensatory damages.'
Therefore, the basic requirement is met by showing that
the injuries to the plaintiff must have entitled him to com-
pensation," and exemplary damages may be awarded under
this theory even though compensatory damages were not
actually awarded for one reason or another 9
Some jurisdictions accept nominal damages as a basis
for the recovery of exemplary damages, 0 and others do
not.1 Where the compensatory damages are not capable of
measurement,'1 2 the rule allowing exemplary damages would
seem to be the more justifiable. A strict adherence to the rule
of actual damages as a prerequisite would not allow recovery
in such a case.
The Federal courts and some states allowing exemplary
damages as an independent basis of recovery without re-
quiring actual damages, set forth the theory that these dam-
ages neither depend upon, nor bear any relation to the
allowance of actual damages.1 3  The fact that exemplary
damages, unlike compensatory damages, do not lend them-
selves to outside or formulistic standards is given as a rea-
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1960) "In any action for the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, when the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, In addition to actual
damages, may give damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing
the defendant." See McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W 512, 520 (1933),
aff'd on rehearsng.
7. See Sterling Drug v. Banatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d 393, 221 P.2d 965 (1950).
8. See e.g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) Foster
V. Sikes, 202 Ga. 122, 42 S.E.2d 441 (1947).
9. See Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932) Fauver v. Wilo-
ske, 123 Mont. 211, 211 P.2d 420 (1949) Barber v. Hohl, supra note 2.
10. Udell v. Josephson, 11 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
11. Thompson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n of Omaha, 83 F Supp.
656 (N.D. Iowa 1949) see supra note 6.
12. See Barber v. Hohl, supra note 2.
13. Wardman-Justice Motors, Inc. v. Petrie, 39 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1930)
Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) Purifoy v. Central of
Georgia Ry. Co., 218 Ala. 11, 117 So. 466 (1928), Barber v. Hohl, 40 N.J. Super.
526, 123 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1956).
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son for refusing to require a relationship between them. 4
This is an attempt to prevent a wrongdoer from having
actual immunity merely because the injured party is unable
to show that there was a measurable injury 15
Under the view of North Dakota, and the great weight
of authority, it is possible for the defendant to escape liabil-
ity when the plaintiff cannot prove an actual monetary loss.
It is submitted that this is-not the better rule to follow
DALE W MOENCH
ARMED SERVICES-DEFERMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS-
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS-C O N S T I T UTI O N A L I TY OF
"SUPREME BEING" REQUIREMENT-Convicted of failing to
submit to induction in the armed forces,1 the defendant
appealed, asserting he was improperly denied exemption as
a conscientious objector because his objections were not
dependent upon a belief in relation to a "Supreme Being",
as required by statute. 2  The defendant had declined to
assert a belief in a deity, but convinced authorities he held
a sincere religious faith in a purely ethical creed that pro-
hibited him from participating in any form of war Revers-
ing the trial court, the United States Court of Appeals, 2 Cir.,
held, that in the light of recent decisions by the Supreme
Court, a line such as is drawn by the "Supreme Being" re-
quirement between different forms of religious expression can-
14. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
15. See Reynolds v. Pegler, supra note 8, at 38, in which the Court said.
"Punitive or exemplary damages are intended to act as a deterrent upon the
libeler so that he will not repeat the offense, and to serve as a warning to
others. Punitive damages are allowed on the ground of public policy and
not because the plaintiff has suffered any monetary damages for which he is
entitled to reimbursement; the award goes to him simply because it is assessed
in his particular suit. The damages may be considered expressive of the com-
munity attitude towards one who willfully and wantonly causes hurt or injury
to another."
1. United States v. Seeger, 216 F Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
2. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 STAT. 604 (1948), 50
U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958). The act provides: "Nothing contained in this title
shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and
service who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously op-
posed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this
connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per-
sonal moral code. "
336 [VOL. 40
